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Using Empirical Research to Design Government
Citizen Participation Processes: A Case Study of
Citizens’ Roles in Environmental Compliance and
Enforcement
David L. Markell & Tom R. Tyler∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

The issue of what role(s) citizens should play in governance is one of
many outstanding, oft-debated questions about the appropriate structure
and operation of our institutions of governance.1 Some commentators
have argued strongly for increasing citizens’ opportunities to participate
in government decision-making processes and to shape government
outcomes.2 Others have taken considerably more skeptical positions
∗
Steven M. Goldstein Professor, Florida State University College of Law, and University
Professor, Psychology Department, New York University, respectively. Professors Beth Burch, Jon
Klick, Wayne Logan, Greg Mitchell, and Joseph Sanders contributed very helpful comments on
drafts of this article. We also are grateful for the insightful suggestions we received in presenting the
paper during the November 2007 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies at NYU Law School.
Stephanie Weisbrod, FSU College of Law ‘09, and Miriam Coles, FSU College of Law ‘08,
provided excellent research assistance. Judith Brodkin, Sarah Meyer, Jamila Gooden (all FSU
College of Law ‘07), and Avital Mentovich (NYU graduate student in psychology) researched and
compiled the lists of individuals and organizations we notified about our survey and helped us to
track responses. We are grateful to them for their hard work on this part of the project.
1. This question is addressed in the extensive literature about the legitimacy of the
administrative state, among others. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for
the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1516–28 (1992). For a few articles that focus
particularly on the role of citizens in domestic governance in the United States, see, for example,
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 546 (2000); Sidney
A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith in Pragmatic
Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689, 689–90 (2000); Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the
Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 439–40 (2003); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation
of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1672–73 (1975). The appropriate role for
citizens in governance is also the focus of an ongoing dialogue in the international arena. See, e.g.,
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 104–30 (2004); Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries
of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 274–78 (1997)
(listing potential benefits and concerns associated with empowering non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) to participate in governance).
2. Some of the rationales offered for greater citizen involvement include enhancing
government legitimacy and strengthening government performance. See generally David Markell,
“Slack” in the Administrative State and Its Implications for Governance: The Issue of
Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 10 (2005) (identifying and summarizing several such rationales).
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about empowering citizens.3 The skeptics are concerned that citizen
engagement will cause delays and otherwise lead to inefficient decisionmaking,4 empower the already empowered and thereby do little to
enhance legitimacy or more broadly-based decision-making,5 and elevate
the voice of “squeaky wheels,” thus undermining the role expertise
should, and otherwise would, play in agency decision-making.6
Despite the concerns that skeptics and others have raised, the reality
is that an enormous number and variety of citizen participation
mechanisms exist in domestic and global governance.7 Further, in recent
years, support for citizen engagement has made creation of new hybrid
approaches intended to increase public involvement a regular feature of
the governance landscape.8 Congress has been receptive and has adopted
several policies in recent years intended to increase the role of citizens in
governance.9 Government agencies have pursued the same tack.10
3. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 23, 29 (1985)
(“Participation has costs as well as benefits.”); Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of
Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 177 (1997)
(stating “political theorists have often suggested that mass participation is not always a positive good
for democracy”).
4. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 3, at 23 (noting the “participatory approach [] has serious
limitations); Rossi, supra note 3, at 177–78 (“[T]he increase in mass participation itself may have
adversely affected the quality of bureaucratic decisionmaking.”).
5. See MASHAW, supra note 3, at 24 (“[I]nterests that are substantially affected might, because
of lack of resources or organization, fail to participate effectively in administrative forums.”); see
also Michael S. Greve, Private Enforcement, Private Rewards: How Environmental Citizen Suits
Became an Entitlement Program, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS
107–08 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992) (arguing that citizen participation
through citizen suits is a tool for self-interested special interest groups).
6. See MASHAW, supra note 3, at 24 (“[C]ertain interests, because of their intensity, resources,
and organization, will come to dominate even an open decision-making process.”). Other concerns
about NGOs and their participation in governance have been raised as well. Accountability (or lack
thereof) has been a prominent topic. For treatment of the “dark side” of civil society, see ARIEL C.
ARMONY, THE DUBIOUS LINK: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION 56–103 (2004).
7. For information on the field we study in this article—public involvement in environmental
regulation—see, for example, U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF POLICY, ECONOMICS & INNOVATION, PUBLIC
INVOLVEMENT POLICY OF THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 2 (2003), available at
http://www.epa.gov/publicinvolvement/pdf/policy2003.pdf.
8. For example, Congress has encouraged negotiated rulemaking, and, more recently, has
promoted e-rulemaking. Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and
Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 943–47 (2006) [hereinafter Coglianese, Citizen Participation]; Cary
Coglianese, Internet and Citizen Participation in Rulemaking, 1 J.L. & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y
33, 44–47 (2005) [hereinafter Coglianese, Internet and Citizen Participation]. For treatment of
institutions in a variety of countries that provide for different levels of citizen participation, see
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Advisory Counterparts to Constitutional Courts, 56 DUKE L.J. 953
(2007). For a brief survey of the increasing role of NGOs in international diplomacy, and the
different types of NGOs, see Kal Raustiala & Natalie L. Bridgeman, Nonstate Actors in the Global
Climate Regime, (UCLA Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research
Paper No. 07-29), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1028603.
9. See, e.g., Coglianese, Citizen Participation, supra note 8, at 943–45; Coglianese, Internet
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Rhetoric in support of extensive and meaningful public engagement
has not necessarily matched reality. Public involvement is not something
that can be taken for granted. With even relatively simple forms of
involvement in government processes (for example, voting in elections),
encouraging public participation has proven difficult.11
This project is animated by our desire to improve understanding of
approaches that are likely to be effective in engendering enhanced public
involvement.12 A key threshold issue involves determining the types of
features that are likely to be effective in encouraging citizen involvement
in governance. That is, what types of government procedures and
institutions will motivate citizens to come forward and be part of
government decision-making?13
We are at an early stage of
understanding concerning these issues. As Professor Mariano-Florentino
Cuéllar has noted, we still have a great deal to learn about both “actual

and Citizen Participation, supra note 8, at 42–43; Rossi, supra note 3, at 174–75. The Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) provides an opportunity for citizen engagement that was intended to
enhance government accountability and educate the citizenry, though some have claimed it is
unnecessary while others have questioned its effectiveness. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom
of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-06), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/abstract=1088413.
10. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, supra note 7, at 1. On the other hand, national security concerns have
contributed to recent initiatives to restrict access to certain types of information. See, e.g., Michael
Fitzpatrick, Code Orange: Will It Be Used to “End-Run” Federal Rulemaking Requirements?, 29
ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 11, 11 (2004) (suggesting that a variety of laws passed in response to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, implicate the availability of information to the public).
11. For example, only 42% of the voting-age population reported voting in the 2002
congressional election; only 41.9% of eligible potential voters voted in the 1998 congressional
elections, which was a record low. JENNIFER CHEESEMAN DAY & KELLY HOLDER, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2002 14–15 (2004),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-552.pdf.
12. The question of the appropriate level of public involvement in governance is beyond the
scope of this effort. There are pros and cons to different levels of citizen participation in different
governance structures. See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 3. Citizen confidence in processes may increase
their willingness to defer to them. This idea of voluntary deference is central to emerging models of
self-regulation, but requires that the procedures used are experienced by those involved as
appropriate and reasonable mechanisms. See generally Marius Aalders & Ton Wilthagen, Moving
Beyond Command-and-Control: Reflexivity in the Regulation of Occupational Safety and Health and
the Environment, 19 LAW & POL’Y 415 (1997); Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise
and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997); Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189
(2002).
13. While our focus will be on environmental disputes, the issue of procedural acceptability
comes up wherever there are hotly contested questions at issue. In the past, one area that has been
the focus of many efforts to identify acceptable procedures for resolving disputes is family court,
which deals with divorce, child custody, and child support payments. For a review of this topic, see
PENELOPE EILEEN BRYAN, CONSTRUCTIVE DIVORCE: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND SOCIOLEGAL
REFORM (2005).
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and potential public participation” in governance.14 Additional work is
needed to refine and enhance our grasp of the nature of and reasons why
citizens prefer different types of decision-making processes.15
As scholars from various disciplines continue to wrestle with the
issue of how to engage the public in government processes, our
theoretical frame of reference lies in the psychology literature. That
literature pursues an ongoing exploration of the relative influence of
“distributive justice” and “procedural justice” concerns in shaping citizen
perspectives on different governance approaches.16 The concept of
“distributive justice” focuses on the fairness or appropriateness of a
procedure’s outcomes.17 In contrast, “procedural justice” involves the
extent to which citizens value a process because of its procedural
features.18
The emerging body of work on the relative salience to citizens of
distributive and procedural justice in different types of processes
suggests that citizens value both types of justice. As one of us has
suggested: “[t]he expanded model [of social justice] recognizes that
people are concerned about how decisions are made as well as about
what those decisions are”—the distinction between substantive and
14. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411,
417 (2005). It is also the case that a wide variety of factors may influence the extent of public
involvement in any governance issue. See, e.g., David L. Markell, Understanding Citizen
Perspectives on Government Decision Making Processes as a Way to Improve the Administrative
State, 36 ENVTL. L. 651, 655 (2006) [hereinafter Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives] (“A
potentially valuable step in fostering citizen participation in government decision making processes
is to incorporate in these processes features that are important to citizens. Processes that citizens
value are likely to be processes that citizens use and that enhance citizen confidence in government,
while processes with features that citizens find unsatisfactory are likely to be processes that do not
engender meaningful citizen input . . . .”).
15. Gerald S. Leventhal, What Should Be Done with Equity Theory? New Approaches to the
Study of Fairness in Social Relationships, in SOCIAL EXCHANGE: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND
RESEARCH 27, 39 (Kenneth J. Gergen et al. eds., 1980). Others have echoed the need for more
research and analysis concerning other aspects of the issue of government operations and legitimacy.
See, e.g., James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000:
Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535, 538, 555 (2003) (noting that “we
have a long way to go in understanding the relationship between institutional performance and
legitimacy” and that “only with more valid measures of institutional legitimacy can we make
progress in unraveling the causal linkages between performance and legitimacy”).
16. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 85 (1997).
17. See, e.g., id. at 45–74.
18. Author Tom Tyler defines “procedural justice” as involving participants’ satisfaction with
decision-making processes. Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens
to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 104 (1988) [hereinafter
Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?]; see also Leventhal, supra note 15, at 39 (“[A] justice rule is
defined as a belief that allocative procedures are fair when they satisfy certain criteria. This type of
justice rule is referred to as a procedural rule, to distinguish it from distribution rules . . . .”). We
acknowledge it is not always possible to completely disentangle the concepts of distributive justice
and procedural justice and that is the case for our results.
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procedural justice.19 This work has, in addition, begun to shed light on
the relative importance of procedural and distributive justice to citizens
as well as why they find these concepts significant.20 Nevertheless,
Professor Cuéllar’s caution that we still have much to learn certainly
continues to hold true. With respect to our understanding of citizen
perspectives on the desirability of different governance mechanisms from
a use standpoint, it is especially true, since most of the existing research
on distributive and procedural justice only focuses upon people’s
willingness to accept decisions resulting from legal procedures.21
Our purpose in this article is to advance understanding of how
citizens perceive and value different types of government processes that
are intended to encourage or facilitate citizen involvement. Our view is
that, when dealing with government decision-making processes that seek
to encourage citizen involvement, it is valuable to understand which
types of processes citizens favor and, further, the particular features of
processes that citizens believe are especially worthwhile. Our project,
through what we refer to as an empirical governance approach, is
intended to advance the state of knowledge in both areas.22
Part II of this Article describes the design of our project, particularly
our focus on mechanisms for citizens to participate in governance in the
environmental-enforcement arena. Part III summarizes the methodology
we used in developing our questionnaire for citizens interested in this
field of governance. Part IV focuses on the questionnaire respondents’
views concerning different types of procedures available to citizens
interested in participating in promoting environmental compliance. Part
V addresses respondents’ views concerning the different features of these
mechanisms. Part VI focuses in particular on respondents’ perspectives
regarding two mechanisms available to citizens: citizen suits under the
environmental laws, and the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation’s (CEC’s) citizen submissions process. Part VII, among
19. TYLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 75.
20. See, e.g., id. at 85, 100 (suggesting that procedural justice may be even more important than
distributive justice in some contexts).
21. Willingness to use a procedure and willingness to defer to an outcome from it are related,
but different, issues. See generally JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975) (examining both people’s pre-procedure preferences concerning
how their dispute should be resolved and their post-evaluations of the decisions reached). More
recently, Tom R. Tyler et al., The Two Psychologies of Conflict Resolution: Differing Antecedents of
Pre-Experience Choices and Post-Experience Evaluations, in 2 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP
RELATIONS 99–118 (1999), directly compared pre- and post-experience evaluations of procedures.
22. Commentators have identified a number of reasons why citizen involvement is, or may be,
beneficial. One outstanding question concerns the potential relationship between the hoped-for
benefits of participation and the nature of citizens’ views about different process features.
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other things, concludes by offering a simplified matrix approach for
designing suitable procedures when a goal is to engage citizens.
II. CITIZEN PREFERENCES AND ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN
Our initial research project focused on citizen opportunities to
participate in environmental enforcement and compliance efforts in the
United States.23 We identified eleven types of opportunities for citizens
in the United States to participate in environmental enforcement and
compliance.24
These opportunities ranged from mechanisms we
anticipate are relatively common knowledge in the environmental field
(e.g., citizen suit provisions that exist under the major environmental
statutes),25 to mechanisms with which many citizens and others may have
had little if any contact (e.g., the opportunity to file petitions with the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to withdraw a State’s
authorization to implement a regulatory program because of deficiencies
in the State’s enforcement performance).26
We asked respondents a series of questions about each of these
opportunities for citizens to participate in governance to encourage
compliance with the environmental laws.27 In the initial section of the
questionnaire we asked for basic information about people’s preferences
for and overall levels of satisfaction with these extant mechanisms
available to citizens. For example, we asked respondents to rank the

23. Author David Markell presented this effort during the Fall 2006 International Union for the
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) conference held at Pace Law School and also discussed it during an
August 2007 meeting of the Organization of American States Sustainable Development
Environmental Law Advisory Group. Several NGOs, professors, and others expressed interest in
our pursuing similar work concerning enforcement practices in a significant number of other
countries. Our plan at this point is to explore these opportunities following completion of this initial
study of practices in the United States. Further, we are currently undertaking a similar study
involving citizen participation processes in the land use arena, with a particular focus on growth
management.
24. See infra appended Tables 1–2.
25. Citizen suit provisions have been included in the major environmental statutes for more
than thirty years since their inception in the early 1970s. They have been used frequently during that
period. For example, in a 2003 article, Professor Jim May indicates that since 1995, citizens have
submitted more than 4500 notices of intent to file citizen suits and, on average, have filed about one
lawsuit per week. James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits, 10
WIDENER L. REV. 1, 4, 30 (2003). The citizen suit provisions for three of the major federal
environmental regulatory statutes are set forth in Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2000); and Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §
7604 (2000).
26. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 271.22–.23 (2007) (authorizing citizens to file such petitions for
withdrawal of State RCRA authorization). Far fewer such petitions have been filed.
27. See infra appended Tables 1–4. See infra Part III for a summary of our methodology.
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eleven mechanisms in order of preference.28 In addition, we asked them
to assign a value to the opportunities in an absolute sense—in terms of
how helpful any of the opportunities are likely to be in enabling
respondents to achieve their goals. Our goal in this section of the
questionnaire was to understand respondents’ preferences for different
procedures and to assess respondents’ views concerning the likely
efficacy of these procedures in helping them to achieve their goals.
In the next part of the questionnaire, we sought to unpack the reasons
why citizens favor one type of opportunity to participate in enforcement
or compliance work over another. Based in part on the procedural and
distributive justice literature,29 we identified twenty-two features of
decision-making processes and asked respondents about the importance
of each such feature. Features included the opportunity to provide
written comments to decision makers, the availability of funding support
for participation, the neutrality of the decision-making entity, and several
others.
Different extant processes available to citizens in the
enforcement arena included different combinations of these features.
Here we sought to understand why a procedure is desirable.
In addition to asking citizens about their preferences for particular
features of government decision-making processes in the abstract, we
focused specific attention on two such processes in the environmental
enforcement arena: citizen suits available under the environmental laws
against alleged violators,30 and the CEC’s citizen submissions process,
which allows citizens in the United States to file complaints in which
they allege the government is failing to effectively enforce one or more
environmental laws.31 Viewed through the lens of the procedural and
28. As part of this inquiry, we ask whether a respondent is familiar with each mechanism, to
develop a sense of the role of familiarity in forming preferences.
29. E.g., Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?, supra note 18, at 103–35.
30. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 1365(a)(1); Clean Air Act § 7604(a)(1), (3); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act § 6972(a)(1).
31. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. XIV,
1993,
http://www.cec.org/pubs_info_resources/law_treat_agree/naaec/index.cfm?varlan=english
(last visited Oct. 3, 2008) [hereinafter NAAEC]. For an overview of the CEC citizen submissions
process, see, for example, David L. Markell, The Commission for Environmental Cooperation’s
Citizen Submission Process, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 545 (2000) [hereinafter Markell,
Commission for Environmental Cooperation]. For a broader review of the CEC, see GREENING
NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 256–57 (David
L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003) and specifically David L. Markell, The CEC Citizen
Submissions Process: On or Off Course?, in GREENING NAFTA, supra, at 274–98. See also John H.
Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with International Environmental Law: The Submissions
Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 32 (2001); David L.
Markell, Governance of International Institutions: A Review of the North American Commission for
Environmental Cooperation’s Citizen Submissions Process, 30 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 759
(2005) [hereinafter Markell, Governance of International Institutions].
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distributive justice literatures, it is clear these procedures vary
significantly, as explained below.
Citizen suits are probably the best known vehicle for citizens to
participate in environmental enforcement and compliance work.32 Each
of the major environmental regulatory statutes creates a cause of action
for citizens,33 allowing citizens with standing to bring suit in federal
district court and claim a regulated party is operating in violation of one
or more federal environmental laws.34 Citizens have extensive rights of
participation in such cases. They may pursue discovery in order to
develop a better understanding of regulated party and government
regulators’ performance.35 They may also participate actively in the trial
phase of litigation by offering witnesses, cross-examining hostile
witnesses, and engaging in the other features of conventional trial
practice.36 Further, citizens may seek wide-ranging relief, including
punitive civil sanctions that can amount to as much as $32,500 per day
per violation for each day a violation continues,37 remedial relief to
require a violator to cease its violations and, in some cases, to repair
injury it has caused.38 Another key feature of citizen suit mechanisms in
the federal environmental laws is that substantially prevailing citizens
may recover attorneys’ fees.39
The CEC’s citizen submissions process is a much more recent
addition to the menu of citizens’ options for influencing environmental
enforcement. Its features differ significantly from the citizen suit
32. A significant amount of scholarship exists on citizen suits. See, e.g., Symposium,
Environmental Citizen Suits at Thirtysomething: A Celebration & Summit, Part I, 10 WIDENER L.
REV. 1 (2003); Symposium, Citizen Suits and the Future of Standing in the 21st Century: From
Lujan to Laidlaw and Beyond, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (2001).
33. See supra note 30.
34. The elements of such causes of action vary depending on the statute. See Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 64–65 (1987) (holding that a citizen
must make a good faith allegation that a party is operating in violation of the Clean Water Act and
comparing the Act’s jurisdictional requirement with the more flexible requirement in RCRA).
35. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (rules concerning discovery).
36. See id. at 38–53.
37. 40 C.F.R. § 19.4, tbl. 1 (2007). Penalties in citizen suits go to the U.S. Treasury. See, e.g.,
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 106 (1998).
38. See David Markell, Is There a Possible Role for Regulatory Enforcement in the Effort to
Value, Protect, and Restore Ecosystem Services?, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 549, 554, 558, 572–
74 (2007).
39. The test for recovering attorneys’ fees depends on the statute. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602–03 (2001) (discussing the
“American Rule” and the “catalyst theory”); see also Amigos Bravos v. EPA, 324 F.3d 1166, 1168
(10th Cir. 2003) (discussing the “catalyst theory” under the Clean Water Act); Sierra Club v. EPA,
322 F.3d 718, 719 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (discussing recovery of attorneys’ fees under the Clean Air Act);
Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 307 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002)
(discussing fee-shifting provisions under the Endangered Species Act).
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mechanism summarized in the preceding paragraph. Citizen access to
this mechanism is intended to be easier than citizen access to initiate a
citizen suit in the courts. Standing, for example, is not supposed to be a
significant hurdle to citizen participation in the CEC process.40 Further,
the CEC process is intended to allow citizens to raise concerns about
environmental enforcement without having to invest significant
resources of the sort sometimes needed to press litigation. Rather than
emulate the civil litigation’s discovery and litigation process—which can
be quite time-consuming and expensive for citizens—the CEC citizen
submissions process invests the CEC Secretariat with responsibility for
administration of the process after a citizen complaint is filed.41 The
Secretariat administers its own investigative and fact-gathering process
to pursue citizen concerns about non-compliance and ineffectual
enforcement practices.42 The trade off for citizens is that in some
respects the CEC process provides much more limited opportunities for
participation than traditional civil litigation. Citizens have little, if any,
ability to confront or obtain information from the offending entity whose
activities citizens believe are flawed.43 Similarly, citizens’ rights to
interact with the “decision maker” (in this process, the CEC Secretariat
and the CEC Council, depending on the stage of the process) are much
more limited than in civil litigation.44
Similarly, the possible outcomes of the CEC process differ
significantly from possible outcomes of citizen suits. For the former, the
end result is the “reflexive” approach of spotlighting perceived
inadequate performance with the hope that the attention will motivate
improvements.45 Penalties and injunctive relief are not available under

40. The CEC is prepared to consider submissions from citizens without first requiring that
citizens demonstrate harm of the sort that may be required for initiation of a citizen suit. On the
other hand, there are limitations in the CEC process that do not exist in the citizen suit arena. See,
e.g., NAAEC, supra note 31, art. 14(3)(a)(ii); see also Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives,
supra note 14, at 654–55.
41. See generally NAAEC, supra note 31, art. 14 (outlining the citizen submission process).
42. See id. art. 15(4).
43. There is no opportunity for any form of discovery. Markell, Understanding Citizen
Perspectives, supra note 14, at 686. Thus, FOIA is the primary tool available to citizens to obtain
information. See generally The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
44. Markell, Commission for Environmental Cooperation, supra note 31, at 550–63. For
example, there is no opportunity for hearings. Id. at 562–63.
45. A. Dan Tarlock & John E. Thorson, Coordinating Land and Water Use in the San Pedro
River Basin: What Role for the CEO?, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 31, at 217, 231 (discussing
“reflexive approaches”); see also Eric Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227,
1278 (1995) (discussing how the EPA’s “new policy’s emphasis on ‘self-policing’ and ‘selfdisclosure’ fits with an emerging model of reflexive environmental regulation”).
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the CEC process.46 Finally, while the CEC Secretariat is intended to do
much of the “heavy lifting” in investigating citizen complaints, there is
no provision for attorneys’ fees or other support for citizen engagement
in the process.47
In sum, the citizen suits available under the major federal
environmental laws and the citizen submission process created under the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) environmental side
agreement represent very different approaches to engaging citizens in
environmental enforcement.
Access to the CEC process differs
significantly from access to traditional citizen suit mechanisms; the
nature of the processes and opportunities for financial assistance differ
significantly, and the end results vary dramatically.
In theory, one procedure is intended to be a “traditional” adversary
process in which citizens are actively involved throughout, operating
before an independent tribunal with considerable authority to engage in
fact-finding, authorize fact-finding by citizens, and impose appropriate
relief. The other is intended to be more of a cooperative process in
which citizens operate in a “fire alarm” capacity, and which
circumscribes the tribunal’s authority to facilitate and conduct factfinding or to impose relief.48
There is already a considerable body of commentary about these
mechanisms. With respect to citizen suits, for example, scholars and
others have opined at great length about the efficacy of such suits, and
the importance of different features.49 Concerns about gaining access to
the courts to raise concerns have been a recurring theme.50 Another
significant issue has been the costs of litigation and the possibilities of
recovering fees.51 Similarly, several commentators have written about
46. Rather, NAAEC Article 15 merely provides for the development and possible publication
of a factual record. See NAAEC, supra note 31, art. 15(2).
47. See generally id. arts. 14–15 (regarding submissions on enforcement matters and factual
records).
48. Kal Raustiala, Citizen Submissions and Treaty Review in the NAAEC, in GREENING
NAFTA, supra note 31, at 256, 264 (discussing “fire alarms”). Substantively, the focus of the two
processes differs as well. Citizen suits tend to focus on particular violations, while the CEC process
potentially has a broader scope. See Markell, Governance of International Institutions, supra note
31, at 791. Further, while citizen suits focus on alleged violator activity, the CEC process focuses on
government enforcement performance. See Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives, supra
note 14, at 662.
49. See, e.g., Jim Hecker, The Difficulty of Citizen Enforcement of the Clean Air Act, 10
WIDENER L. REV. 303, 304–05 (2004); Patrick Parenteau, Citizen Suits Under the Endangered
Species Act: Survival of the Fittest, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 321, 322 (2004).
50. See, e.g., Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WIS. L.
REV. 897, 915 (2006).
51. See, e.g., ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY
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the effectiveness of the CEC citizen submissions process and about the
key features that account for its success (or lack thereof).52 Citizens have
raised concerns about the lack of transparency in the process, for
example.53 Another concern is that the “playing field” has not been level
because the CEC Council, which exercises an integral role in
implementing the process, has not been neutral in performing its
responsibilities.54 Other concerns have been raised about the quantity
and quality of opportunities for citizens to participate in the process, and
about the adequacy of the remedial side of the process.55
Our empirical governance approach is intended to build on, and
begin to test, the extant literature on enforcement mechanisms that allow
for citizen involvement, including citizen suits and the CEC’s citizen
submissions process. In particular, the project is intended to serve as a
model for how to develop empirical information about at least two
issues: (1) the nature of citizen preferences for different types of
opportunities to participate in environmental enforcement and
compliance-related activities, and (2) the reasons why citizens prefer
some mechanisms to others—in particular, the value citizens attach to
specific features of participation opportunities. More generally, as noted
above, our argument is that many areas of the legal system could
potentially benefit from the development of a framework through which
publicly desirable procedures could be designed. It is often the case that,
for example, irrespective of whether we are discussing environmental
conflicts or disputes in small claims court, the public is resistant to
participating in governance or in deferring to the decisions governance
institutions make. We would benefit in such settings from better
information about what dispute resolution processes are desirable in the
1037 n.8 (5th ed. 2007).
52. Randy Christensen, The Citizen Submission Process Under NAFTA: Observations after 10
Years, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 165 (2004) (noting that the citizen submission process has been an
effective means of “highlighting environmental problems, compelling governments to engage in
debates, and bringing about positive environmental change through independent factual
investigations”); Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives, supra note 14, at 651 (2006);
Gustavo Alanís Ortega, Public Participation within NAFTA’s Environmental Agreement: The
Mexican Experience, in LINKING TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIAL COHESION: NAFTA
EXPERIENCES, GLOBAL CHALLENGES 183–86 (John J. Kirton and Virginia W. Maclaren eds., 2002);
Chris Wold et al., The Inadequacy of the Citizen Submission Process of Articles 14 & 15 of the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
415, 416–17 (2004).
53. Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives, supra note 14, at 688–91.
54. Id.
55. Other mechanisms in addition to citizen suits and the CEC process have been the subject of
commentary as well. See, e.g., Janet V. Siegel, Negotiating for Environmental Justice: Turning
Polluters into “Good Neighbors” Through Collaborative Bargaining, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 147,
180–88 (2002) (discussing Good Neighbor Agreements).
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eyes of both the disputants and the public more generally. We offer this
initial article in order to share our objectives, to solicit feedback on the
entire project, and, hopefully, to stimulate similar efforts to embrace the
legal academy’s call to greater recourse for empirical work in order to
inform review and development of public policy.56
III. METHODOLOGY
A wide variety of people involved in environmental litigation were
asked via e-mail to participate in this study by completing our
questionnaire.57 Our target group was environmental activists because
this is a group likely to be interested in participating in environmental
enforcement by using one or more of the mechanisms we identified.58
We made a systematic effort to identify individuals (lawyers and clients)
who had used the different mechanisms we listed. For citizen suits under
the environmental laws, for example, we identified and tried to contact
all plaintiffs and lawyers who between January 1, 2004, and March 13,
2006, filed citizen suits against alleged violators of the Clean Water Act,
the Clean Air Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, as
well as those plaintiffs and lawyers who filed lawsuits against the
government during that time period under one or more of these laws for
alleged failure to effectively enforce the provisions of the statute(s) in
question.59 We identified and sought to contact all U.S. non56. The legal academy has highlighted the importance of empirical work as an important tool to
a greater understanding of how society works and of how to refine it so that it works better. For
example, the 2006 Association of American Law Schools (AALS) annual meeting focused on
empirical scholarship. See Ass’n of Am. Law Sch. Annual Meeting, http://www.aals.org/am2006
/theme.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2008).
57. We also contacted several individuals by telephone who had used one or more of the
mechanisms we asked about.
58. Our choice of respondents highlights a broader question, notably, whose views are relevant
to questions concerning governance structure? Is it the general public? Or is it the groups that are
most likely to actually participate, e.g., activists? As noted in the text, in this initial effort we
focused on environmental activists because we believed they were likely to participate in the
procedures we identified and also because our focus in this project is on use of the government
processes. For some purposes, investigating the views of broader population cross-sections is
obviously appropriate. This issue is an important one for methodological design.
59. Two databases were used to conduct this search: (1) Westlaw and (2) Public Access to
Court Electronic Records (PACER). PACER is an electronic service that allows users to search case
and docket information from federal appellate, district, and bankruptcy courts, and from the U.S.
Party/Case Index.
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, What is PACER?,
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/pacerdesc.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008). The PACER System offers
electronic access to case dockets to retrieve information such as a listing of all parties and
participants, the nature of the suit, and the types of documents filed for each case. Id. PACER has a
list of codes that correspond to different types of lawsuits. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
PACER Frequently Asked Questions, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/faq.html (last visited Oct. 4,
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governmental organizations (NGOs) and NGO attorneys that have filed
submissions with the CEC process.60 Similarly, through a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request to EPA we obtained a list of all entities
that have filed petitions to withdraw state authorization. We sought to
contact each of these.61
To participate in the study, respondents logged into a web-based
survey site62 and completed a questionnaire. We received thirty
responses. To learn more about our respondents, we asked them to
classify themselves in two ways. First, they indicated their political
party affiliation, ranging from strongly Republican (7) to strongly
Democratic (1).63 The mean was 2.08, suggesting that most respondents
2008). Suits primarily concerned with environmental issues are tagged with code 893.
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, PACER Nature of Suit Glossary,
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/natsuit.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008). A search was conducted for all
civil suits filed between January 1, 2004, and March 13, 2006, that had code 893. This returned over
1000 cases. Because PACER does not have the capability to further restrict the search, the docket
for each case was viewed and the first complaint downloaded to ascertain whether the suit was filed
pursuant to one of the statutes in question.
A search on Westlaw was also conducted. Westlaw allows for the input of search terms as a
means to restrict the results returned in a docket and/or pleadings search. The search terms used
were: “33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(1)” “42 U.S.C. 7604(a)(1)” “42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(1)” “42 U.S.C.
7604(a)(3)” “42 U.S.C. 7604(a)(2)” “33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(2)” and “42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(2).” These are
the citations for the citizen suit provisions of the statutes in question. Because Westlaw allowed for
the use of more restrictive search terms, the citizen suit information was compiled using this
database. After we completed this part of the task, we again consulted PACER to locate any civil
suits meeting the search criteria that could not be found on Westlaw.
The mailing address and e-mail address for each attorney were located on Westlaw or PACER if
available in those databases. For each attorney who did not have an e-mail address available on
Westlaw or PACER, a Google search was conducted to locate the Web site of the law firm or
organization of those attorneys. If available, the e-mail address for the attorney was taken from the
Web site. E-mail addresses for the plaintiffs were not available on either Westlaw or PACER. A
Google search was conducted to locate the Web site of each institutional or organizational plaintiff.
If available, the e-mail address for each institution or organization was taken from the Web site. No
search was conducted for plaintiffs listed as individuals.
Not all courts make their information available for the PACER U.S. Party/Case Index.
Additionally, not all of the cases had pleadings that were available for viewing on either Westlaw or
PACER. These two circumstances placed limitations on the number of citizen suits from which the
plaintiff and attorney information could be drawn.
60. We obtained this information from www.cec.org, the CEC Web site.
61. For a list of these entities, see Letter from Marilyn J. Kuray, Attorney-Advisor, Office of
Gen. Counsel, Cross-Cutting Issues Law Office, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to David Markell (Mar.
29, 2005), at 1–16 (on file with authors). In addition to these specific groups, we sought to reach all
of the law school environmental clinics who represent public interest groups by sending an e-mail to
members of the clinic listserve notifying them of the survey and requesting they complete it. We
also contacted representatives of several national environmental groups (National Resources Defense
Counsel, the Sierra Club, etc.) and requested that they complete the survey and notify their
colleagues of the opportunity to do so.
62. We used the Create Survey Web site, http://www.createsurvey.com (last visited Oct. 4,
2008).
63. David Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Survey, Stakeholder Input into Environmental Regulation
(Dec. 19, 2006), http://www.createsurvey.com/cgi-bin/pollfrm?s=36069&m=zaclZV (last visited
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were Democratic.64 An examination of the responses showed 89% of the
respondents were Democratic, 12% moderate.65 Similarly, respondents
classified themselves as extremely conservative (7) to extremely liberal
(1).66 The mean was 2.41, with 78% of respondents indicating they were
liberal, 18% indicating they were moderate, and 4% indicating they were
conservative.67
The questionnaire also included an eight-item trust-in-government
scale. The items were: “You can usually trust the government to do what
is right”; “You are generally satisfied with the actions of the government
in the area of environmental regulation”; “You feel that the government
is run for the benefit of all the people”; “If you took a complaint over
environmental policy to the government, your views would be given
attention”; “People like yourself have considerable influence over
government decisions about environmental policy”; “There is not much
about our government that you feel proud of (reverse scored)”; “The
government is too strongly influenced by special interests looking out for
themselves (reverse scored)”; and “You are often frustrated by the
actions of government agencies (reverse scored).”68 The item responses
ranged from disagree strongly (1) to agree strongly (6).69 The overall
scale scores ranged from one to six, with high scores indicating a high
level of trust. The mean was 2.44 (standard deviation = 0.77; alpha =
0.83), reflecting limited trust and confidence in government.70
Respondents also indicated their confidence in social institutions on
a scale ranging from low confidence (1) to high confidence (6). They
first indicated their confidence in the people running eight institutions:
the American business community, the executive branch, the press, the
Supreme Court, the Congress, regulatory agencies of the government,
non-governmental agencies, and state governments.71 They then rated
how frequently leaders of these same institutions try to do what is right
Sept. 9, 2008) [hereinafter Survey].
64. Stakeholder Input into Environmental Regulation: Survey Results (2007) (on file with
authors) [hereinafter Survey Results].
65. Id.
66. See Survey, supra note 63.
67. See Survey Results, supra note 64.
68. See Survey, supra note 63.
69. Id.
70. See Survey Results, supra note 64. Coefficient alpha is a term used by psychologists to
refer to the degree to which the items in a scale belong together. Essentially, it reflects the average
intercorrelation among items. Higher numbers indicate higher intercorrelation and a better scale.
Numbers above 0.80 are excellent and numbers above 0.60 are reasonable. See N.C. State Univ.,
Scales and Standard Measures, http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/PA765/standard.htm (last visited
Oct. 4, 2008).
71. See Survey, supra note 63.
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for all the people in their communities, using a scale ranging from never
(1) to always (6).72 The mean for the sixteen-item scale was 3.11
(standard deviation = 0.61; alpha = 0.85).73 Respondents had much more
confidence in the people running NGOs than was the case for other
institutions.
We also asked respondents how important they think it is to have a
procedure available in situations involving violations of the
environmental laws so that people can use it (1 = very unimportant; 6 =
very important).74 The results of this analysis are shown in appended
Table 1.75 Respondents indicated that all of the mechanisms we listed
should be available and that people are most likely to believe traditional
legal mechanisms should be available.76 Those include the ability to file
a citizen lawsuit (mean = 5.89), to file a citizen suit against the
government (mean = 5.74), and to file a common law action (mean =
5.42).77
In short, this set of responses allows us to begin examining
preferences among those who are likely to initiate or participate in
environmental enforcement litigation or other similar actions—
environmental activists and the attorneys who represent them. Overall,
these results indicate that those completing the questionnaire are
generally Democratic and liberal, having low levels of trust and
confidence in government and other social institutions; the marked
exception being NGOs (the mean trust in NGOs was 3.93, versus an
average of 2.90 for other institutions on a scale ranging from 1 to 6, with
high scores indicating more trust).78 Further, they strongly support a
legal system that affords citizens significant opportunities to participate
in promoting compliance with the environmental laws.79
It is obviously possible that a random cross-section of the population
would have provided very different responses if we had targeted such a
group. Our findings should be considered with this limitation in mind.
Thus, for example, a policy maker interested in designing a process

72. Id.
73. See Survey Results, supra note 64.
74. See Survey, supra note 63.
75. See infra appended Table 1. In appended Table 1, a scale of 1 to 6 is used. Each
respondent is asked to rate the desirability of having each of the eleven procedures available for
people to use.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Survey Results, supra note 64.
79. Id.
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intended to appeal to the general population might well use a different
methodology to select questionnaire recipients.80
Further, even among Environmental NGOs, it has been theorized that
the type of organization in which a person works may influence that
person’s views concerning different issues. For example, a group’s
funding sources may be very relevant to its views concerning the
importance of an attorneys’ fees recovery provision in a participation
process.81 A follow-up, expanded research effort would seek to obtain
more nuanced information of this sort.
IV. WHAT PROCEDURES DO PEOPLE SAY THEY ARE LIKELY TO USE TO
RESOLVE ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES?
People completing the questionnaire were asked to indicate their
likelihood of using each of eleven procedures to resolve two types of
environmental disputes. The first type of dispute is one in which “a
single party is violating its environmental obligations.”82 The second
type of dispute involves a situation in which “widespread violations are
occurring at many locations and are being committed by many
individuals or companies, e.g., several companies are violating their
Clean Water Act permitting obligations.”83
These procedures are as follows:
(1) File a citizen suit against the violator based upon statutory law.
(2) Participate in a government enforcement action.
(3) File a common law cause of action.
(4) File a submission with the CEC.
(5) File a citizen suit against the government.
(6) Raise concerns with the EPA’s Office of Inspector General.
(7) Petition the EPA to withdraw state authorization.
(8) Informal contact with the violator.
80. See supra note 58. The idea that a procedure should be acceptable to people irrespective of
ideology, ethnicity, or other characteristics, (e.g., wealth), has been articulated in the literature on
dispute resolution. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind, Yuen J. Huo & Tom R. Tyler, . . . And Justice for All:
Ethnicity, Gender, and Preferences for Dispute Resolution Procedures, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
269 (1994); Tom R. Tyler, Governing Amid Diversity: The Effect of Fair Decisionmaking
Procedures on the Legitimacy of Government, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 809 (1994); Tom R. Tyler,
Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law and to Legal Authorities, 25 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 983 (2000).
81. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis
for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411 (2000).
82. See Survey, supra note 63.
83. Id.
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(9) Informal contact with the government.
(10) Pursue shaming opportunities, such as notifying the media.
(11) Take some other type of action.84
A. Results
Appended Table 2 indicates the likelihood that respondents think
they would use any of these eleven procedures.85 In the case of an
individual violation, the primary procedure respondents indicated they
would use is filing a citizen lawsuit (mean = 4.93).86 With widespread
violations, respondents indicated they would be most likely to use
shaming mechanisms (mean = 4.39).87 These initial findings suggest that
respondents generally view lawsuits as the key mechanism they would
use to respond to wrongdoing in single violation situations. In contrast,
they are more likely to pursue a shaming opportunity and less likely to
file a lawsuit in the widespread violation context.88
A second question respondents were asked is whether any of the
actions identified would allow them to achieve their goals in the
situation. Respondents were given a six-point scale on which they noted
the likelihood that at least one of the actions listed would allow them to
achieve their goals (very unlikely; unlikely; somewhat unlikely;
somewhat likely; likely; very likely).89 Responses were collapsed into
two groups: likely and unlikely. In the case of the single violator, 71%
indicated at least one was likely to be effective.90 With multiple
violators, 68% indicated at least one was likely to be effective.91
B. Implications
It is interesting that respondents identified different process
preferences depending on the nature of the non-compliance involved.
84. See infra appended Table 1.
85. See infra appended Table 2. Appended Table 1, infra, shows the eleven procedures
outlined. For each procedure, respondents were asked whether they were familiar with it. See
Survey, supra note 63. Among those who said “yes,” the average likelihood of using each procedure
is determined separately for single and widespread violations. Higher numbers indicate a greater
likelihood of using the procedure.
86. See infra appended Table 2.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Survey, supra note 63.
90. See Survey Results, supra note 64.
91. Id.
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Respondents were more likely to view citizen litigation as desirable for
single violations.92 With widespread violations, people preferred going
outside the legal system and using shaming mechanisms.93
Further research would be useful to determine why citizen activists
may prefer different mechanisms depending on the context. We
speculate that at least part of the answer may be that respondents are
more confident in the likely efficacy of citizen lawsuits in the single
violator situation than in the multiple violator context. But, it would be
worth further investigation to assess whether the difference is based
primarily or entirely on concerns related to distributive justice (e.g., the
likelihood of “success” anticipated in using different mechanisms in
different contexts) or whether procedural justice issues play a role in the
differing preferences as well. Further, if procedural justice issues are
relevant, there is the question of which aspects of procedural justice are
most salient.94 As we point out infra,95 we found through other questions
that procedural justice features vary in their salience to citizens
depending on the process involved.
Similarly, our findings raise a question concerning the role of
familiarity in shaping the respondents’ preferences. Approximately 80%
of those who completed the questionnaire indicated they are familiar
with the traditional legal mechanism of the lawsuit because they have
personally been involved in using that procedure in the past, and suggest
they would respond to a legal problem by using that mechanism in the
future.96 They are less accustomed to using other procedures, such as the
CEC procedure.97 In fact, almost none of the respondents had any
personal experience with the CEC procedure, which is not surprising
given that it is a new and not widely used procedure.98 One possible
explanation for the relative popularity of citizen suits that is consistent
with our findings is that people prefer procedures with which they have
personal experience.99 More research would be needed to test the role of
92. See infra appended Table 2.
93. Id.
94. See infra Part VI.
95. Id.
96. See Survey Results, supra note 64.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Considerable research in psychology supports the argument that people are more likely to
like those aspects of social situations with which they are familiar. See, e.g., Robert B. Zajonc,
Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure, 9 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPH SUPP., pt. 2,
1 (1968) (offering a hypothesis that repeated exposure to a stimulus object enhances an individual’s
attitude toward it). Familiarity is obviously not necessarily the only reason lawsuits are preferred.
More work, along the lines discussed in Parts V and VI, will help shed light on the role of familiarity
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familiarity in respondents’ preferences among the procedures we
identified.
Also of interest are the findings concerning expectations of
effectiveness of any of the processes in the two situations we studied.
The suggestion that citizens may be less sanguine about the likely
efficacy of existing legal or other mechanisms to address situations
involving multiple violators seemingly raises questions about the
efficacy of such mechanisms to deal with potentially larger noncompliance situations—for example, whether there is a gap, unintended
or not, in our legal mechanisms for addressing non-compliance.100
Somewhat related, approximately 30% of those interviewed do not
think any of the existing mechanisms will enable them to achieve their
goals.101 This suggests more research is needed regarding their
normative and other goals and the relationship of those goals to societal
interests and priorities. In this study, we did not ask people what their
goals were, only whether they could achieve them within the existing
structure.
V. WHAT ARE THE FEATURES OF A DESIRABLE PROCEDURE?
The ratings indicate that respondents varied in the degree in which
they regarded different procedures as being procedures they would use
and/or as procedures they felt should be available for others to use. We
were interested in understanding why respondents made these
desirability ratings.
To examine why procedures were viewed as desirable, we asked
respondents to indicate how important different procedural features were
to the desirability of those procedures. The scale used was (1) very
unimportant to (6) very important. Ratings for seventeen attributes are
presented in appended Table 3.102 Those attributes are grouped into six
compared to other factors. We asked respondents about their overall familiarity with the processes
we were studying in the specific context of each of the fact patterns we were asking about. Thus, it
is possible that respondents’ greater familiarity with lawsuits in the individual violator situation may
have affected their preferences.
100. In addition to questions concerning the utility or efficacy of extant legal mechanisms in
addressing non-compliance in different situations, questions exist concerning optimal levels of
compliance and enforcement. See, e.g., David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based
Enforcement in a “Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality,
24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2000). Similarly, there are questions regarding optimal
availability of lawsuits and other mechanisms in light of different goals and contextual realities, such
as enhancing legitimacy and resource constraints.
101. See Survey Results, supra note 64.
102. See infra appended Table 3. People were asked about twenty-two attributes, seventeen of
which fit into traditional procedural justice categories. Appended Table 3 shows two types of
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procedural clusters: overall procedural justice, neutrality, trust, respect,
voice, and control over the outcome.103 Overall average scores are
presented for the clusters.104
A. Results
One reason people might view a procedure as desirable is that it
allows them to achieve their outcome goals. Respondents indicated that
the ability to achieve their outcome goals was one important aspect of a
procedure (mean = 5.51).105 In particular, people wanted to have an
opportunity to change behavior they objected to (mean = 5.71).106
Interestingly, people also valued other elements of procedures
besides the outcome they would deliver. In particular, people put weight
on having neutral procedures (mean = 5.58).107 This included procedures
that would lead to factually-based decisions (mean = 5.88); procedures
that would lead to legally appropriate outcomes (mean = 5.64);
procedures that allowed appeals (mean = 5.43); and procedures that
consistently applied laws to particular legal problems (mean = 5.39).108
They also valued evidence that decision makers are trustworthy.
Authorities are viewed as more trustworthy when they give adequate
attention to the concerns of those who appear before them and when they
explain the reasoning behind their decisions. Respondents indicated
adequate consideration of their concerns was especially important (mean
= 5.33).109

results. First, scales were constructed to represent ideas. Those scales combine the items listed
below them. The mean desirability of each idea is reflected in the average for that scale, with higher
numbers indicating more desirability. The desirability of each item is also shown, using the same
scale. So, for example, the mean desirability of neutrality is 5.58, while the mean desirability for a
decision based on facts, one of the five items that make up the neutrality scale, is 5.88. See id.
103. See infra appended Table 3. “Overall procedural justice” means that people were simply
asked whether the procedure is just. The other four categories ask about procedural dimensions
often associated with procedural justice. Past studies have suggested that the four categories explain
about 80% of the variance in overall procedural justice judgments. See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J.
HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 76–
96 (2002).
104. See infra appended Table 3.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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B. Implications
These findings support the traditional procedural justice finding that
people care about more than just winning their case. The finding that the
likely outcome of a procedure shapes its desirability follows naturally
from the suggestion that people approach wrongdoing with the
motivation to end behavior they view as inappropriate and illegal.
However, the ability to successfully bridge across different views
concerning conduct in a given setting depends upon people being willing
to use or participate in processes in which they do not control the
outcome (and cannot be assured that the outcome will be favorable).110
In this setting, as in earlier research on procedural justice, people
recognized the importance of concerns beyond their own self-interest. In
fact, people rated having a neutral forum as being the most important
feature of a procedure (mean = 5.58).111 A neutral forum is one that
leads to a fact-based (mean = 5.88) and lawful (mean = 5.64) outcome.112
It is not simply a procedure that allows the party to prevail and achieve
the outcome it wants.
The respondents also rated having a trustworthy authority as the
decision maker as important to their concern with prevailing and
achieving their desired outcome when they are evaluating a procedure’s
desirability (mean = 5.16).113 A trustworthy authority is an authority
who considers the concerns of the parties when deciding (mean = 5.33)
and who explains the reasons for the decision after making it (mean =
4.96).114 Again, these concerns reflect procedural concerns that may
relate to, but appear to be distinct from, winning.115
Overall, these findings suggest that respondents recognized the value
of using procedures that have the characteristics of a just procedure—in

110. As one of us has pointed out elsewhere, this is important to citizens’ willingness to defer to
the outcomes of processes as well as to their willingness to participate in them. See Tyler, What is
Procedural Justice?, supra note 18, at 104 (defining “procedural justice”).
111. See infra appended Table 3.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Trust is correlated with control (r = 0.22, n.s.), suggesting that people believe they are more
likely to achieve desired outcomes when they have a trustworthy authority. David L. Markell &
Tom R. Tyler, Analysis (data on file with authors). Similarly, people are more likely to believe they
will achieve desired outcomes in a neutral procedure (r = 0.36, n.s.). Id. In general, people believe
they are more likely to achieve desired outcomes when the procedure is fair (r = 0.38, ρ < 0.05). Id.
On the other hand, people can see the difference between a procedure that is likely to lead to a
desirable outcome and a procedure that is fair. Id.
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particular, neutrality and a trustworthy decision maker. This suggests
openness to participating in a process because it is a fair one.116
VI. WHY ARE CITIZEN SUITS AND THE CEC CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS
PROCESS DESIRABLE?
The previously outlined findings are based upon people’s views on
what they believe leads a procedure to be desirable to them. An
alternative approach to addressing this question is to correlate the
existence of procedural features with desirability ratings, inferring that
people find a feature desirable when the desirability of a procedure is
linked to whether or not it has that feature. This approach was applied to
two procedures: citizen lawsuits and the CEC procedure.117
Desirability was assessed for single actors and for large-scale
wrongdoing. The single-actor scale and the large-scale-wrongdoing
scales each had the same seven items: “You would be satisfied with this
mechanism as a way to respond”; “Using this mechanism would be a
good way to respond to a violation”; “You would be very willing to use
this mechanism”; “You would generally favor using this mechanism”;
“Having this mechanism available allows citizens to play an
appropriately strong role in promoting compliance with the law”; “This
mechanism gives citizens a meaningful way to shape environmental
law”; and “This mechanism gives citizens a meaningful way to shape the
regulatory actions of government.”118 Both scales were reliable for
citizen suits and for the CEC submissions process, with the former more
reliable than the latter.119
Several procedural attributes were assessed. First, overall procedural
justice was measured by asking respondents whether the procedure was
“generally . . . a fair procedure for handling your complaint.”120
Neutrality was assessed using five items: the procedure would “Lead
to a decision based on facts”; “Lead to a decision reflecting a consistent
application of the law”; “Provide adequate opportunities to appeal”;
116. It also suggests openness to accepting the results of a decision because it is made fairly. As
has been noted elsewhere, it is this willingness to defer to fair procedures that is central to the ability
of the courts to manage contentious environmental disputes. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R.
TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) [hereinafter LIND & TYLER, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY]; TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE,
LEGITIMACY, AND COMPLIANCE (2006); TYLER & HUO, supra note 103.
117. See infra appended Table 4.
118. See Survey, supra note 63.
119. See infra appended Table 4; Survey Results, supra note 64; see also supra note 70.
120. See Survey, supra note 63.
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“Lead to appropriate application of the law to legal liability”; and “Lead
to a decision fair to everyone involved.”121
Trust in authorities was measured using two items: the procedure
would “Lead to a decision based on an adequate consideration of your
concerns,” and would “Lead to a decision in which the authorities
adequately explained their reasons.”122
Respect was also measured using two items: the procedure would
“Respect everyone’s rights” and would “Treat those involved with
dignity and courtesy.”123
Voice was measured using four items. The items indicated that the
procedure would “Provide an opportunity to present arguments in
writing”; “Provide an opportunity to present arguments orally”; “Enable
you to have a dialogue with the other party”; and “Enable you to have a
dialogue with the decision maker.”124
Finally, control over outcomes was measured using three items: the
procedure would “Give you some control over the outcome,” would
“Help you get the outcome you wanted,” and would “Provide you a way
to effectively change the behavior to which you object.”125
A. Results
An intriguing finding about respondents’ views concerning the
desirability of citizen suits and the CEC citizen submission procedure is
that the features in the citizen suit process that respondents valued are
very different from the citizen submission features to which respondents
gave highest value.126 As shown in appended Table 4, the key issue
shaping desirability concerning the citizen submission procedure is the
degree to which the procedure provides opportunities for voice (r =
0.58), followed by the extent to which people believe they will be treated
121. See infra appended Table 3; Survey, supra note 63.
122. See infra appended Table 3; Survey, supra note 63.
123. See infra appended Table 3; Survey, supra note 63.
124. See infra appended Table 3; Survey, supra note 63.
125. See infra appended Table 3; Survey, supra note 63.
126. An important qualification concerning the responses regarding the CEC procedure is that,
while twenty-four of the thirty respondents indicated they have been involved in lawsuits, only two
of the respondents have used the CEC procedure. This means the CEC procedure ratings are based
upon indirect knowledge of the CEC procedure; namely, respondents’ expectations about what will
happen if they use the procedure or information from others who have used it. The lower
reliabilities associated with evaluations of the CEC procedure reflect the lack of personal experience
with the CEC procedure, and indicates that respondents have a less clearly formed understanding of
this procedure. Having familiarity with a procedure allows people to make more coherent
evaluations of its features.
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with courtesy and respect in the process (r = 0.48).127 In contrast, for the
lawsuit procedure, neutrality and trust were the central procedural
dimensions.128 In the case of both procedures, control over outcomes is
important (r = 0.42).129
Interestingly, unlike the findings with lawsuits, overall procedural
justice ratings for the citizen submission process are not strongly linked
to desirability (r = 0.28).130 In the case of lawsuits, these overall ratings
were the strongest predictor of desirability (r = 0.50).131 Why the
difference? Additional research is needed to understand this response,
including the relationship between overall procedural justice ratings and
the desirability of a procedure. One possibility is that respondents
associated procedural justice with neutrality—a feature of lawsuit
desirability—and not with voice or respect. This raises the question of
whether, when people think about the question of whether a procedure is
just, they may be drawn to thinking about whether the procedure is factbased and rule-guided (i.e., neutral). Based upon legal training, or the
legal framing of issues, people may not associate treatment with respect
and dignity with the issue of whether a procedure is just or unjust.
However, as we have noted, other research shows people do make that
connection in practice.132 When treated disrespectfully, they say a
procedure is unjust.133 Hence, it may be that our respondents’ prior
judgments about the procedural justice of traditional legal procedures
emphasize elements of decision-making, rather than issues of
interpersonal treatment. Again, further research is needed to explore this
finding.
B. Implications
These findings are potentially important and warrant follow-up
because, as indicated above, they suggest that respondents value different
procedures for different reasons. What factors are linked to the
127. See infra appended Table 4.
128. Id.
129. Id. As noted supra, citizens have little control over the outcome of the CEC process.
Future research to elaborate on the importance of outcomes to the value of processes like the CEC
procedure would be an important contribution. See, e.g., Markell, Understanding Citizen
Perspectives, supra note 14.
130. See infra appended Table 4.
131. Id.
132. Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice:
Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process, 29 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747–58
(2003) [hereinafter Blader & Tyler, A Four-Component Model].
133. Id.
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desirability of lawsuits? The analyses shown in appended Table 4134
indicate that respondents prefer lawsuits to the degree their overall
judgment is that the procedure is fair (“provide[s] a just procedure for
handling your complaint”) (r = 0.50), they feel the procedure is neutral (r
= 0.50), the decision-making is trustworthy (r = 0.45), and they have
control over the outcome (r = 0.49).135 As was the case with the
hypothetical ratings of procedural desirability, respondents’ evaluations
of the acceptability of procedures suggest they are concerned about more
than their own outcomes.136 Respondents, of course, want a procedure in
which they will prevail. However, they want more than that. They also
want a procedure that is fair. Thus, the respondents’ views suggest that
citizens are, other things being equal, seemingly more likely to
participate in, or use, procedures they view to have these characteristics
than procedures that do not.
It is also interesting that this perspective on lawsuits mirrors the
traditional concerns of the legal system with the trial process through
which lawsuits are often resolved. Discussions of the legal system focus
upon the role of a trustworthy authority (the judge, the jury) neutrally
evaluating the evidence in an objective, fact-based manner in which legal
rules are consistently applied and where prejudice and bias are
minimized or even eliminated.137
However, it is striking that the respondents’ reactions to the CEC
procedure were based upon very different procedural issues than those
shaping reactions to lawsuits. If respondents simply brought their views
about legal procedures, derived from lawsuits, to the evaluation of this
new procedure (which, as noted above, few respondents had used) then
they should consider the same issues in evaluating both procedures.
Instead, they evaluated the CEC procedure very differently.
The two procedural factors that mattered most concerning the CEC
procedure were voice and respect.138 Hence, respondents thought about
this procedure in a way that is distinct from their general frame for
evaluating lawsuits. They focused upon whether they would have a
chance to present their views and whether they would be treated with
134. See infra appended Table 4. Appended Table 4 shows the strength of the statistical
relationship between judgments that a procedure is desirable and judgments about its attributes. The
statistic is the correlation (r). An r of zero suggests no relationship, while an r of 1 indicates a
complete correspondence (e.g., gender and being able to give birth).
135. Infra appended Table 4; see also Survey Results, supra note 64.
136. See infra appended Table 4.
137. See, e.g., THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 21, at 1 (covering “methods or procedures that
may be used to resolve conflicts that arise between individuals and between groups”).
138. See infra appended Table 4.
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respect and courtesy. These findings are important because they suggest
that, in some cases, a process that highlights these features may be
effective in enhancing government legitimacy and increasing citizen
involvement.
To explore the importance of this finding, we need to consider the
issues that mattered in each case. With the CEC procedure, respondents
focused upon whether the procedure provides “an opportunity to present
your arguments orally”; whether everyone’s rights are respected; and
whether those involved are treated with dignity and respect.139 These
issues are related to the quality of interpersonal treatment.
With lawsuits, respondents cared about “decisions based upon the
facts”; “decision[s] reflecting a consistent application of the law”; “a
neutral decision”; “an appropriate decision in terms of [legal] liability”; a
decision “fair to everyone involved”; “a decision that provides adequate
opportunities to appeal”; “a decision based upon an adequate
consideration of your arguments by the decision maker”; and “a decision
in which the authorities adequately explain their reasoning.”140 These
issues are centered on the view that the decision is appropriate and
reasonable. They are issues linked to the quality of decision-making.
Each of these two aspects of procedures—quality of interpersonal
treatment and quality of decision-making—contributes to judgments
about the fairness of legal procedures.141 Quality of treatment involves
treatment with politeness and dignity, concern for people’s rights, and
other aspects of procedures that are not directly linked to the decisions
being made through the procedure.142 Quality of decision-making by
authorities emphasizes issues of decision-maker neutrality, the
objectivity and fact-based quality of decision-making, and the
consistency of rule application.143
The finding that interested citizens may value different procedures
for different reasons also suggests that such citizens may prefer one
139. See Survey Results, supra note 64.
140. See id.
141. TYLER & HUO, supra note 103, at 95–96 (Tyler and Huo considered the importance of these
factors in shaping judgments about the overall justice in personal experiences with legal authorities.
They found that both the quality of decision-making and the quality of interpersonal treatment are
more important than outcome favorability in shaping judgments about the justice of the experience).
These two aspects of procedure also are obviously not necessarily entirely distinct.
142. See Blader & Tyler, A Four-Component Model, supra note 132; Steven L. Blader & Tom
R. Tyler, What Constitutes Fairness in Work Settings? A Four-Component Model of Procedural
Justice, 13 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. REV. 107 (2003) [hereinafter Blader & Tyler, What Constitutes
Fairness?].
143. Blader & Tyler, A Four-Component Model, supra note 132; Blader & Tyler, What
Constitutes Fairness?, supra note 142.
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procedure in one context because its predominant features are perceived
to be particularly important in that context, while they may prefer
another procedure in a different setting, for the same reason.
It may be helpful to consider the comparison of lawsuits and
mediation. When mediation was first introduced in court settings, people
did not want to use it.144 They came to court with litigation in mind. 145
When court systems required pre-trial mediation, however, the courts
found that many cases were resolved in mediation and, when people
participated in mediation, they rated it as more satisfactory than a trial,
irrespective of whether their case was resolved.146 In other words, once
people experienced the procedure, they liked it. This suggests the
possibility that, although people are not asking for the CEC procedure, or
procedures with elements that highlight procedural justice features such
as voice and respect, they might value such a process if they used it.
VII.

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

One question we sought to explore in this paper involves the possible
role of procedural justice concepts, as well as distributive justice, in
creating citizen interest in using legal procedures. Respondents indicated
that, in the case of lawsuits, procedural influences are similar in strength
to the influence of the likelihood that a procedure would yield a desirable
outcome.147 For example, procedural desirability is shaped by outcome
control (r = 0.49), but equally strongly by procedural justice (r = 0.50),
neutrality (r = 0.50), and trust in the decision maker (r = 0.45).148
Procedural influences were weaker for the CEC process.149 The analyses
reported reinforce the argument that people react favorably to the
fairness of procedures and show that these fairness judgments are distinct
from the desire to obtain a particular outcome. People can and do
distinguish procedural fairness from winning, and even from having
things come out right (i.e., achieving distributive justice). The fact that

144. See, e.g., Tyler et al., supra note 21 at 99–118.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 429–30.
147. Ideally we would be able to consider the influence of both factors simultaneously using
regression analysis. However, the small size of the sample does not allow for this type of analysis.
148. See infra appended Table 4.
149. Id.
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respondents value procedural justice features suggests it is worth
considering these features in process design.
Beyond this finding, which is supported by previous research in
other settings, two of the intriguing findings from the questionnaire
responses are that (1) respondents attach different value to the same
procedure in different contexts, and (2) respondents value different
procedures for different reasons—namely, individuals like particular
features best in certain procedures while they prefer different features in
other mechanisms.
The key insight from these findings is that context seems to matter in
terms of citizen satisfaction—that is, it may be that no set of features will
be valued uniformly in different contexts and, further, different features
will be valued more or less highly depending on the process involved.
These findings suggest the value of targeted, context-specific follow-up
research to develop more sophisticated understandings of citizen
preferences for procedures.
We believe the approach we have modeled in this project can be
followed to assess procedural options in different contexts in which there
is an interest in encouraging meaningful citizen engagement. That is,
interested stakeholders (some appropriate subset of the universe of likely
participants) can be asked about their preferences for different
procedures in a particular context and, further, about their preferences for
different features of processes; policy makers can then incorporate this
information into their efforts to design processes that will be responsive
to these desires, in addition to considering other relevant factors as part
of such design work.150
We suggest it may be possible to consider a matrix approach for
designing suitable procedures for different situations, again to the extent
the goal is to engage citizens in such procedures. The following matrix
is a simplification of what we are looking for, but it hopefully is
illustrative of the type of inquiry that may be helpful. It reflects our
speculation that development of typologies for at least four variables in
dispute resolution contexts may help to advance capacity to tailor
procedures to the interests of concerned citizens: (1) the personal
150. Even in the limited context of seeking to enhance citizen engagement, this ex ante approach
has limits. An example of those limits is provided by the literature on mediation. People do not
seek mediation in courts, thinking they prefer adjudication. If required to engage in mediation,
however, many people find it engaging, and, overall, mediation is rated post-use as more satisfactory
than adjudication. However, the features that make mediation popular post-use are not the same
features that people seek when they come to court. Further, process design obviously needs to
consider a wide variety of factors beyond the impacts of different options on likely levels of citizen
participation. See, e.g., supra note 12.
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characteristics of likely process participants; (2) the potential clarity of
the outcome; (3) the contentiousness of the issues; and (4) how much is
at stake.151
The Impact of Situational Issues and Stakeholder Characteristics
on the Weight Placed upon Different Procedural Elements
Personal
characteristics
The person’s
motivation for
taking action

Potential clarity
of the outcome
Weight placed
upon:
-neutrality
-trust
-respect
-voice
-overall
procedural
justice

Contextual issues
Contentiousness
of the issues
Weight placed
upon:
-neutrality
-trust
-respect
-voice
-overall
procedural
justice

How much is at
stake?
Weight placed
upon:
-neutrality
-trust
-respect
-voice
-overall
procedural
justice

Trust in the
government

Weight placed
upon:
-neutrality
-trust
-respect
-voice
-overall
procedural
justice

Weight placed
upon:
-neutrality
-trust
-respect
-voice
-overall
procedural
justice

Weight placed
upon:
-neutrality
-trust
-respect
-voice
-overall
procedural
justice

Capacity to
participate
(e.g., to make
oral or
written
arguments)

Weight placed
upon:
-neutrality
-trust
-respect
-voice
-overall
procedural
justice

Weight placed
upon:
-neutrality
-trust
-respect
-voice
-overall
procedural
justice

Weight placed
upon:
-neutrality
-trust
-respect
-voice
-overall
procedural
justice

151. Our model matrix is a simplification of possible citizen perspectives for several reasons.
This is an initial effort intended to stimulate refinements that will help to produce inventories of the
types of variables relevant in different contexts, among different stakeholders, in engendering
meaningful citizen participation. For example, the matrix in the text only allows for evaluating
citizen preferences for different procedures in single contextual situations. It is possible to extend
our model approach to develop matrices that account for different contextual scenarios taken
together. Similarly, it is possible to account for the importance of outcome by incorporating a
distributive justice column in the matrix.
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As this preliminary effort at a matrix reflects, one key variable
involves the traits or characteristics of likely participants. The point here
is that different disputes involve different groups of stakeholders and,
further, different procedures may be more or less attractive depending on
the preferences of the particular groups involved. The notion that we
should consider the attributes of users in designing procedures is well
established in law. In the procedural due process context, for example,
the United States Supreme Court in cases such as Mathews v. Eldridge
and Goldberg v. Kelly has focused particular attention on the
characteristics of participants in determining appropriate procedures.152
As the Court in Mathews noted, due process requires that procedures be
tailored “to ‘the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be
heard’ . . . .”153 In our situation, the focus is on the likelihood that
particular features will engage specific constituencies, rather than on due
process implications as in Goldberg and Mathews, but the general idea is
the same; notably that it is appropriate to consider the nature of
stakeholders in designing procedures. Thus, a typology of likely
participants may be helpful in designing procedures intended to engage
them. Not much work has been done in this arena, but for an interesting
example of an effort to distinguish among different environmental NGOs
in terms of their interests, see Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering
Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible
Regulation.154 Further work is needed to begin to develop such a
typology.
We hypothesize that a second key variable in designing dispute
resolution processes so they are effective in engaging citizens is the
nature of the dispute itself. In other words, the type of dispute may affect
the relative importance to participants of different procedures (and
features of processes). Thus, again we suggest the value of a typology,
but this time of different types of disputes. In developing this
hypothesis, it will be important to unpack differences among types of
disputes to determine the differences that matter to likely participants in
terms of their preferences among various procedures. We offer a few
possible distinguishing features in an effort to explain what we mean.
We hypothesize, for example, that a highly contentious dispute may lead
participants (or would-be participants) to prefer different procedures than
less contentious disputes. Similarly, participants may have stronger
preferences for certain features in disputes in which the law is unclear
152. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
153. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349 (quoting Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268–69).
154. See Seidenfeld, supra note 81.
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than in disputes where the governing law is relatively clear. So, for
example, it may be that a procedure like the CEC process, which appears
to be valued for its “voice” and “respect” features, may be valued
relatively highly by participants where outcomes are clear. Again,
follow-up work is needed to explore the details of such a typology—the
distinctions among different types of disputes that are relevant to
participants’ preferences for different types of procedures.155
Finally, we suggest that the type of end result a process produces
also may be relevant in identifying the absolute and relative importance
of different procedural justice features to likely participants in such a
process. If the stakes are high, for example, our hypothesis is that certain
procedural justice features more closely related to outcome may carry
particular importance, while less outcome-related features such as voice
may receive a greater degree of preference for low-stakes disputes.156
While our data is obviously inconclusive, the fact that the CEC process
does not produce a clear outcome and carries no sanctions or other
formal relief offers a possible explanation for why respondents especially
valued softer procedural justice features, such as voice, for this process.
By contrast, they valued outcome-related features for citizen suits where
the stakes, at least in immediate respects such as the prospect of
monetary penalties, injunctive relief, and recovery of attorneys’ fees, are
higher.157 In short, another aspect of a matrix intended to gauge relative
preferences for different procedural justice features may be the outcomes
the process is intended to yield. Because in many situations process
design is constrained in terms of possible outcomes, these types of
constraints may influence participant perception of the utility or
importance of different procedural justice features. As a result, it seems
productive in seeking to improve decision-making processes in terms of
their ability to engage citizens to consider the influence of possible
outcomes on citizens’ preferences among procedural features.
155. In Mathews, for example, the Court focused on the role of factors such as credibility and
veracity in the decision-making process in evaluating the adequacy of different procedures. 424
U.S. at 325.
156. Mathews also focused on outcome in the due process context, concluding that pretermination process is more important in the welfare context than in the disability benefits context
because welfare assistance is “given to persons on the very margin of subsistence . . . .” Id. at 340.
The Mathews Court also included governmental interests in its three-part test, a factor that those
engaged in process design obviously need to consider as well. See id. at 321. Interestingly,
procedural justice studies do not generally find that people care more about procedural issues when
the stakes are low. When stakes are high people continue to view the fairness of procedures as an
important issue. See generally LIND & TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 116
(reviewing the research literature on procedural justice). However, here we are suggesting that
people may focus on different aspects of procedures under different conditions.
157. See supra Part II.
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We do not pretend to have fully considered the possible uses creative
process designers may make of improved understandings of citizen
preferences for different types of procedures and process features in
particular contexts. Perhaps the most straightforward use of insights of
this sort is to reconfigure a process (while also taking into account other
important design parameters such as cost, resources, etc.) so that likely
users of the process are more apt to find it attractive. We can easily
envision other possible uses of this information as well. For example, it
is possible that processes may have synergistic effects, so that a process
strong on some features may not only lead to satisfied users but also, in
the best case, operate to enhance users’ perspectives concerning other
processes as well. As noted above, pre-litigation mediation seems to
offer a possible example of this phenomenon. Many courts require
people to use mediation prior to engaging in litigation.158 Often, parties
are able to settle their disputes through this mechanism and they find
such a process, even with its lower entry barriers and lower costs, quite
satisfactory. Further, even for disputants who use mediation initially but
do not resolve their dispute through such a process and instead move
forward to litigation, the mediation experience is such that disputants
nevertheless are more positive about the litigation experience than those
disputants who did not first participate in mediation.159 Thus, there is a
possibility that a process that rates highly in terms of certain procedural
justice features (e.g., voice and respect) may help to engender higher
confidence in procedures that lack these features but are attractive for
other reasons.
To sum up, how governance institutions should be structured
remains a hot topic conceptually as well as in the field.160 Would-be and
158. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text.
159. The benefit for the legal system lies in the likelihood of reducing the adverse consequences
of a culture of litigation. One of the interesting findings of the mediation literature is that, when
people have pre-trial mediation that fails and then go on to litigation, their rates of accepting
litigation outcomes increase. Even failed mediation, in other words, has a positive influence on the
long-term likelihood of finding an acceptable solution through litigation. See Tom R. Tyler, Social
Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117, 119–20 (2000).
160. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 3, 6 (1997) (suggesting that “the language of regulatory reinvention is ubiquitous”
because of concerns about the structure and operation of the administrative state, and that there is a
need to focus on collaborative approaches that will facilitate adaptive problem solving); Christopher
S. Elmendorf, Advisory Counterparts to Constitutional Courts, 56 DUKE L.J. 953, 955 (2007)
(discussing creation of new, independent institutions “which . . . are concerned with foundational
commitments of liberal democracy” but are intended to advance this commitment through strategies
such as investigations, rather than traditional litigation). Elmendorf refers to these institutions as
“advisory counterparts” to constitutional courts. Id. The CEC citizen submissions process is an
example of such an advisory counterpart. In the environmental arena that is the focus of this article,
there are increasing numbers of examples of regional and other new forms of governance structures
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actual architects or implementers of institutional restructuring have a
variety of goals, including enhancing government’s legitimacy and
credibility, improving effectiveness and efficiency, increasing citizen
engagement, and bolstering willingness to defer to government decisionmaking processes and conform to governmental expectations.161
Our argument in this article is that empirical governance is a useful
tool for those interested in such reforms. Our particular focus is on the
issue of citizen involvement in governance, notably on citizens’ use of
governance mechanisms intended to engage them. If we want people to
participate in government, it is important to structure procedures to
encourage such participation. People always have a choice about how to
respond to evidence of wrongdoing. One choice is to respond through
the legal system. Alternatively, they can become disaffected and
withdraw from active governance. They can choose strategies such as
mounting a media campaign, waging civil disobedience, or starting a
revolution. On a broad scale, when people do not view the procedures
available within the legal system as desirable and appropriate, people do
not bring their disputes to the legal system and the credibility of our
institutions of governance, along with the authority of the law to manage
contentious issues, are diminished.162 Our thesis in this context is that
created to address common environmental concerns, sometimes organized around a common
resource, and other times focused on larger issues. See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers
to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973, 1071 (1995) (discussing the Chesapeake Bay Program);
Scott D. Anderson, Watershed Management and Nonpoint Source Pollution: The Massachusetts
Approach, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 339, 377 (1999) (discussing the Massachusetts Watershed
Initiative); Katherine Fletcher, Protecting Puget Sound: An Experiment in Regional Governance, 65
WASH. L. REV. 359, 366 (1990) (discussing the Puget Sound plan); Errol Meidinger, The
Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L.
47, 48 (2006) (discussing the Forest Stewardship Council).
161. These issues have been particularly salient in local courts and with trial judges seeking to
better manage their dockets. The California courts, for example, recently adopted a strategic plan for
the judicial branch that is focused upon issues of justice for litigants. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
CAL., JUSTICE IN FOCUS: THE STRATEGIC PLAN FOR CALIFORNIA’S JUDICIAL BRANCH 2006–2012
(2006), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/strategic_plan_20062012.pdf. The plan was based upon statewide surveys that identified procedural justice issues as the
primary concern expressed by the public. D.B. Rottman, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS: A SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC AND ATTORNEYS (2005),
available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/4_37pubtrust1.pdf. Such a procedural justice approach has also been advocated by judicial authorities. See, e.g., Kevin Burke &
Steve Leben, PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS: A KEY INGREDIENT IN PUBLIC SATISFACTION (Sept. 26,
2007). Primers on implementing these ideas can be found in Tom R. Tyler, What Do They Expect?:
New Findings Confirm the Precepts of Procedural Fairness, CAL. CTS. REV., Winter 2006, at 22–
24; JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS (2007), available
at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/profair/.
162. There are, of course, limits to the role the legal system should play in resolving disputes.
Notions such as rational ignorance and its impact on citizen interest in participation are beyond the
scope of this paper, as is the appropriate role for extra-legal approaches such as civil disobedience in
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empirical governance, notably systematically studying the preferences of
likely process users in different contexts, can help us learn about the
types of processes interested stakeholders would be inclined to use and,
more particularly, the types of features that are likely to increase such
participation.163

addressing conflict. For an overview of rational ignorance, see Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance
at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1497 n.6 (2001).
163. As we have noted, one problem is that people may not know how they will feel about a
procedure until they have used it. Since very few people have used the CEC procedure, we were not
able to evaluate whether using the procedure changed people’s views about it. As we have noted,
people are much more likely to view mediation as satisfactory after they have used it. See supra
note 146.
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Table 1
Desirability of Availability of Various Procedures
Procedure

Mean (Standard Deviation)

File a citizen lawsuit

5.89 (0.58)

Participate in government enforcement action

5.30 (1.07)

File a common law action

5.42 (1.17)

File a submission with the CEC

4.12 (1.59)

File a citizen suit against the government

5.74 (0.53)

Raise concerns with the EPA

4.78 (1.12)

Petition the EPA to withdraw state authorization

5.30 (0.87)

Informal contact with the violator

4.26 (1.56)

Informal contact with the government

5.37 (0.79)

Pursue shaming opportunity

4.88 (1.56)

Take other action

5.04 (1.60)

Note: N = 30. Scale 1 = very unimportant; 6 = very important.

09.0_MARKELL_FINAL

10/27/2008 4:12:32 PM

36

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

Table 2
Likelihood of Using Various Procedures
to Resolve Environmental Disputes

Procedure

Number of survey
takers unfamiliar
with procedure

Individual is
violating the law

Widespread
violations

Mean (Standard
Deviation)

Mean (Standard
Deviation)

File a citizen lawsuit

1

4.93 (1.41)

4.13 (1.55)

Participate in government
enforcement action

1

3.31 (1.62)

3.89 (1.50)

File a common law
action

2

2.96 (1.40)

2.93 (1.21)

File a submission with
the CEC

6

2.21 (1.38)

2.36 (1.44)

File a citizen suit against
the government

1

3.52 (1.68)

4.11 (1.40)

Raise concerns with the
EPA

2

3.18 (1.68)

3.65 (1.62)

Petition EPA to withdraw
state authorization

2

3.18 (1.54)

3.89 (1.37)

Informal contact with the
violator

2

3.32 (1.66)

2.88 (1.56)

Informal contact with the
government

2

4.11 (1.69)

3.86 (1.69)

Pursue shaming
opportunity

2

4.07 (1.71)

4.39 (1.55)

N/A

4.22 (1.70)

4.00 (1.71)

Take other action

Note: N = 30. Scale 1 = very unlikely; 6 = very likely.
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Table 3
Desirable Attributes of a Procedure
Attributes

Mean

Procedural Justice
Provide a generally fair procedure

5.18
5.18

Neutrality
Lead to a decision based on facts
Lead to a decision reflecting a consistent application of the law
Provide adequate opportunities to appeal
Lead to an appropriate application of the law to legal liability
Lead to a decision fair to everyone involved

5.58
5.88
5.39
5.43
5.64
4.57

Trust
Lead to a decision based upon an adequate consideration of your
concerns
Lead to a decision in which the authorities adequately explained their
reasons

5.16
5.33

Respect
Respect everyone’s rights
Treat those involved with dignity and courtesy

4.73
4.93
4.54

Voice
Provide an opportunity to present arguments in writing
Provide an opportunity to present arguments orally
Enable you to have dialogue with the other party
Enable you to have dialogue with the decision maker

4.40
4.64
4.21
4.00
4.74

Control over the outcome
Provide you a way to effectively change the behavior to which you
object
Help you get the outcome you wanted
Give you some control over the outcome

5.51
5.71

Note: N=30. Scale: 1=very unimportant; 6=very important.

4.96

5.43
5.39
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Table 4
Desirable Attributes Related to Citizen Lawsuits and
CEC Citizen Submissions Process
Single Party

Multiple Party

Overall

Lawsuit

CEC

Lawsuit

CEC

Lawsuit

CEC

Lawsuit

CEC

Attribute

alpha

alpha

r

r

r

r

r

r

Neutrality

0.94

0.81

0.56**

0.03

0.36

-0.01

0.50**

0.06

Trust
decision
maker

0.75

0.67

0.52**

0.31

0.30

0.21

0.45*

0.39

Treated with
respect,
courtesy

0.75

0.63

0.31

0.47*

0.20

0.41*

0.28

0.48*

Voice

0.75

0.66

0.09

0.52*

0.26

0.41*

0.20

0.58**

Control over
outcome

0.82

0.45

0.52**

0.45*

0.38

0.43*

0.49**

0.42*

Rated
procedural
justice

-

-

0.52**

0.28

0.39*

0.25

0.50**

0.28

Adj. R-sq.

-

-

39%**

31%

14%

45%

36%*

44%

Note: The numbers shown in this table refer to correlation coefficient r. The adjusted R.-sq. is for an
equation that includes all of the indices entered at one time.
Twenty-four of thirty respondents indicated they had been involved in lawsuits; two indicated they
had used the CEC procedure.
*ρ<0.05
** ρ <0.01

